The big idea

Toward a definite morality

Establishing numerical moral values

PURPOSE

This elementary mathematical description of the fundamental notion of morality follows from direct observation and adheres to no ideological school or superstructure, at least not by design. While academic exploration of moral philosophy tends to focus on qualitative arguments, this exercise devises moral quantities, assigning numerical values to the otherwise ambiguous concepts “good” and “bad.” If the goal is to find consistency in moral calculations, then perhaps it is time to bring a precise set of measures to the table. The point of this exercise is to establish basic parameters for identifying moral quanta, with the intent of generating a more rigorous model of moral behavior. These parameters define a calculable significance in raw human action.

TWO FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

Life expires at a consistent and variable rate. In other words, life progresses constantly and inevitably toward death, and it does so at an ever­­­­-changing speed based on the actions of individuals and the external forces that act upon them.

People want to live, more than they want to die. Humanity persists despite its proximity to death. People are seldom more than an arm’s length from a means to end life, yet we choose, collectively and individually, to sustain life far more consistently than we choose to end it. In this manner, we have perpetuated the species since its inception.

THE QUANTIFYING MECHANISM

For every action (A) affecting the consistently variable rate of human expiration (R),

if AR<R, then A is good (0<A<1);

if AR=R, then A is morally neutral (A=1);

and if AR>R, then A is bad (A>1).

In plain language, actions that lengthen life are good, and those that hasten death are bad. (The mechanism itself is necessarily basic, but not without nuance in its application.)

An example of expiration rate. Let’s define a large sample group for which there are ample data: Americans. Without adjusting for gender differences, Americans have an average life expectancy of about 80 years. Stated another way, with each passing day, Americans lose about .003 percent of their start-to-finish lives. This figure represents an American’s rate of expiration based, arbitrarily, on a 24-hour cycle. Regardless of the units used to calculate the rate of human expiration, the point is to minimize the rate by maximizing life.

On mensuration. We regularly measure the value of our actions with respect to the rate of human expiration, reporting the results in the familiar language of probability: Walking a mile every day will add so-and-so many years to a person’s life, while smoking a pack of cigarettes every day will shorten a person’s life by so-and-so many years. Regular exercise is good; smoking is bad. With sufficient motivation and the right tools, any action can be framed in this context because all actions obey physical laws and can thus be observed and measured, however imperfectly.

Regarding moral relativism. This system of numerical moral values accounts for relative or situational morality in small samples, which is to say an action that generates a “good” value for certain individuals or groups can generate a “bad” value for others (consider, for example, the act of standing out in a crowd, an alternately life-saving and life-threatening behavior, depending on one's circumstances); yet as the sample size grows from an individual actor, to a small group, to a nation or an entire species, cumulative results point toward moral standards. That is, plotting data from large samples generates lines of best moral fit — overarching moral pathways tracing actions that tend to affect individuals and the group en masse in much the same manner.

Abstract qualities and composite actions. The quantitative nature of this approach limits its ability to address directly the value of abstract qualities, such as “generosity” or “tyranny.” Rather, numerical moral values apply only to actions that exemplify these abstracts. Calculating the value of a quality’s representative actions yields, in aggregate, an approximation of the value of the quality.

Indeed, parsing out even basic actions into smaller components can further refine moral calculations. An embrace, for example, could be expressed as the product of constituent actions such as touching another human being, expressing/gaining trust and intimacy, increasing/decreasing stress, and the like.

Analytical advantage. Following the example of physical science and pursuing more rigorous interpretive models of moral behavior can help social scientists more effectively predict how these behaviors affect our world. Just as physicists use math to decipher the properties of subatomic structures, political scientists can use math to determine the scope of a moral government, or economists can use math to describe the arc of moral commerce.

Special cases. This less-than-romantic approach to moral valuation invites critics, who will almost certainly point to particular actions, special cases, in an attempt to argue perceived inconsistencies. This exercise can only benefit from their ardor.

Euthanasia and abortion are ready examples of special cases — conspicuous actions that in obvious ways simultaneously hasten death in one place and support life in another. Those who align their personal philosophies solely with the life camp or the death camp fight doggedly to exclusively define the moral value of these actions. However, I would speculate that in a specieswide sample, these actions balance life and death, neither appreciably extending the life of humanity nor hastening its decline. They are morally neutral. AR=R. Moreover, I suspect moral neutrality holds for many of the actions that divide people into opposing groups of loudly yelling, wildly gesticulating individuals.